This paper investigates the relationship between economic reforms, particularly the World Bank's Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPS) and educational policies with regard to gender equity in access to schooling in Africa. Using qualitative, historical, and quantitative methods and based on data from UNESCO and African Development Bank, it analyzes the impact of economic factors, specifically gross domestic investment, public expenditure on education as a percentage of gross national product, public expenditure on education as a percentage of government expenditure, and government deficit/surplus as a percentage of GDP at current prices, on women's access to higher education.
Introduction: Issues and Objectives
THIS PAPER IS divided into five major sections including the introduction that presents the issues and objectives. The second part deals with specifications regarding the concepts and methodology. The third section recalls the unequal original distribution of education and the quest for gender equality as articulated in some of the educational reform documents and experiences. The fourth section analyzes the economic crisis, reforms, and especially the structural adjustment programs (SAPs) and the impact of their conditionalities on social services, with focus on the education sector as a whole. The fifth section examines more specifically the structural relation between the economic crisis, the SAPs, and women's access to higher education. The conclusion addresses some of the issues for future educational development and research direction in the next century.
Following the political independence of African countries that started in the 1950s, the next two decades were characterized by high optimism in the possi-90 N'DRI THÉRÈSE ASSIÉ-LUMUMBA bilities for promoting economic growth and development through national human resources. During this period, education appeared to be the most promising domain for investment in the future. Leaders of these newly independent countries made decisions to reverse colonial policies of racial discrimination in access to education (Sékou Touré 1961; Nyerere 1968) . Since the postWWII period, when Africans became active participants of educational policy formulation, many discourses have taken place regarding the need to apply corrective measures to the inherited unequal systems. The efforts of African leaders to appropriate these systems through reform became a tradition in African recent history. Thus, just as other African countries did earlier, when Zimbabwe in 1980 and Namibia in 1990 became independent and South Africa adopted multiracial and majority rule after the 1994 elections, they too initiated educational reforms. In postcolonial reform documents, the African political leaders and education policymakers proclaimed commitment to the democratization of education from the primary to higher levels, emphasizing equal opportunity for the hitherto disadvantaged majority of the population of which the female segment constitutes the largest proportion. In the case of South Africa, for example, in part having learned from earlier experiences in other African countries, an entirely separate document was produced to highlight the importance and urgency of adopting gender-focused policy agendas (Wolpe, Quinlan, and Martinez 1997) . The African optimistic outlook of the 1960s' and 1970s' economic development based on human resources coincided with a renewed and unprecedented popularity of the human capital theory in industrial countries of the West (Schultz 1961) . This contributed to create a general atmosphere characterized by a euphoria, faith, and confidence in education as the "great equalizer," a means for individual development and upward mobility, and an effective instrument for achieving national economic development.
In terms of educational expansion as measured by the enrollment of both male and female school age youth at all levels, African countries accomplished remarkable results during the 1960s and 1970s. It was planned (Conference of African States on the Development of Education in Africa 1961) that by 1980, African countries would eliminate inequality at the primary education level by achieving universal enrollment. This and other policy measures were expected to help reduce and then close the gap at the secondary and higher education levels. However, coinciding with the economic crisis that started in the early 1980s, the positive trends towards closing the gender gap halted, with several cases of decline in general enrollment. This economic situation was characterized by declining prices in the international market of raw agricultural commodities and minerals produced by African countries and by increasing prices of manufactured good imported from industrial countries, compounded in many cases by local mismanagement of public revenues. The states' diminishing financial resources led them to rely more heavily on loans from international institutions to keep their public sectors operational, creating a huge debt crisis. These increased debts in turn led to greater intervention by the international financial institutions, namely the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Unstable and generally declining public resources, as well as externally defined budgets, have had a profoundly negative impact on social programs including education, at both the private/family and public levels, since education had previously been subsidized by the states. One of the consequences of the economic crisis has been a negative impact on countries' abilities and willingness to fund education, thus, resulting in a heavy direct cost for the families required to pay fees previously borne by the state even at the primary level.
Since the mid-1970s, the debates and policies of gender equality have taken center stage, not only at the level of individual nation-state in Africa, but as an international concern, particularly at the United Nations and its various specialized agencies. As I have articulated elsewhere (Assié-Lumumba 1996a) , the question of gender equity in the various domains of society was first recognized as an international concern meriting massive mobilization when 1975 was declared International Women's Year, and then the United Nations declared 1976 to 1985 the Decade for Women. This led to the four major international conferences on women : Mexico City in 1975 , Copenhagen in 1980 , Nairobi in 1985 , and Beijing in 1995 These meetings produced policy documents, which identified the most pressing issues to be tackled by each state. Women's access to and benefit from education have been among the priorities. For instance, the second among the twelve "critical areas of concern" adopted in the Beijing Platform for Action and the Beijing Declaration (United Nations 1996) specifically points to "the inequalities and inadequacies in and unequal access to education and training." The "Beijing Plus Five" Conference, scheduled for June 2000 at the Headquarters of the United Nations in New York City to renew further commitment, is an indicator of the sustained interest in treating gender as a central issue in development.
Besides these gender-focused mega conferences, other major meetings that addressed other social issues have also systematically included a gender component. To cite a few United Nations international conferences that did: 1992 in Rio de Janeiro Conference on Environment and Development, in the Vienna 1993 Conference on Human Rights, the 1994 Cairo Conference on Population and Development, the 1995 Copenhagen World Summit for Social Development, and the 1996 United Nations Conference on Human Settlements in Istanbul. Furthermore, it has become a tradition for nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to seize the opportunity of these meetings to also organize on the same themes, at the same time in the same venue, to raise the voices and concerns of those whose needs are not perceived as a priority by the states. The largest group of people who have been marginalized, and who have been the major organizing force for the NGOs, have been women. Thus, these international meetings, the conventions, and resolutions have become a global arena influencing domestic policies on women's needs.
Despite their nominal political independence, most African countries have designed their domestic policies under the guidance or influence of external powers. Thus, while gender equity has been a source of domestic debate and production of policy documents, the arguments in this paper is that external factors, particularly the economic reforms of SAPs, have negatively influenced domestic policy toward social programs that affect disproportionately women, therefore, leading to continued disparity at the upper level of the systems, despite stated goals of educational reforms.
Lending agencies such as the World Bank and the IMF, governments of industrial countries within bilateral or multilateral frameworks, and foundations have played a central role in defining priorities and designing policies of education in Africa. These agencies' perceived importance of particular levels or types of education have had implications in domestic public resource allocation. This is the context in which the impact of the SAPs of the World Bank and stabilization programs of the IMF have their greatest impact on African women's access to schooling, particularly at the higher education level.
While there are considerable variations of objective conditions and policies adopted, all African countries have been affected by the economic crisis that peaked in the 1980s and by the SAPs. Ironically, it is at the peak that discourse and adoption of policies on educational reforms increased (Ginsburg 1991; Assié-Lumumba and Lumumba-Kasongo 1991) .
The purpose of this article is to analyze the relationship between economic reforms and educational policies with regard to gender equity in access to schooling in Africa with an emphasis on higher education.
Conceptual Framework, Methodology, and Data
As indicated earlier, for newly independent African countries in the 1960s, educational reform became one of the attributes, almost like acquiring a new national anthem or a new flag, that symbolized freedom and self-determination. Reform of a given social system is planned change based on an articulated program geared to improving, at least in principle, an existing situation without having to entirely transform the structure of society or even the structure of the system. Reform of any system, including education, is a statement intended to question some or all of its aspects. The justification against such a reform is its alleged inability to lead to the implementation of previously stated objectives and its inappropriateness for reaching new objectives. As the system functions in the broader society, I argue that, for the reform to succeed, its objectives must not be in conflict with the values and norms of the broader society, as illustrated by the Figure 1 .
The level of congruence (x) or incongruence (−) between the system of education embodied within the proposed reform and the structure of the social formation significantly contributes to the success or failure of the implementation of formulated reform. A critical analysis of the model of society (i.e., that the reform aims at contributing to) is actually different from the existing society. If the proposed reform is based on a populist philosophy while society is elitist, then the reform cannot be implemented as it cannot work against an existing selective system where ascriptive (e.g., social class, gender, race, region of birth and/or residence, nationality) and academic achievement scores, which claim to be based on meritocracy while in fact they tend to be a proxy for social origin factors, are used as screening devices. Thus, in a society that has, for instance, a strong class and/or gender structure, educational reform cannot succeed to produce equality between people of different social classes and sexes. The location of power is key in the definition and implementation of change and is formulated in the reform documents.
It has been argued (Ginsburg et al. 1991) that educational reform can be considered part of "symbolic gestures designed to indicate governmental. . . awareness of problems and sympathetic intentions, rather than serious efforts to achieve social change" (p. 5). Ginsburg et al. (1991) and J. Simmons (1983) stress the determining (although not the sole) weight of political and economic factors in the call for, and formulation of, educational reform.
In his review of 300 articles that deal with educational reforms in Africa, John Craig (1990) identified the determining factors of the failure to implement educational policies. According to the studies reviewed, the policy process, which includes both content and strategy, is considered the most important factor. The political variable is not perceived as important. School factors (e.g., teachers), the "clients," and other resources also are not considered to be important. Craig (1990) argues that these studies lack the classical theoretical and methodological frame usually used in studies, particularly in academic studies in the United States. However, I agree with Joel Samoff (1993) who criticizes Craig (1990) for his assertion that the positivist faith [whereby] explanation means establishing causeeffect relationship by generating testable hypotheses and using them to organize both research and its presentation [and] studies not principally concerned with testing hypotheses -indeed, all other approaches to knowledge and understanding -are fundamentally flawed" (p. 204). The neglect of a theoretical discourse in assessing the nature and fate of educational reform policies, even if specific cases may be used as illustrations, has led to a failure to Threcognize the importance of the political factor while the technical, administrative, and efficiency variables have been given comparatively more weight. Moreover, the efficiency factor can be a convenient argument in that, while being based on "neutrality," it is instead ideologically loaded (Carnoy 1976) with major political consequences within the parameters of educational reform.
Indeed, in industrial countries where the problem of lack of administrative efficiency are not posed with the same nature and magnitude as in the developing world, particularly in Africa, reforms also have failed to lead to the stated goals of equality. In the 1960s, for example, when most African countries became independent, many industrial countries such as the United States and France embarked on major educational reforms; it was a time when education was considered "the great equalizer." In following the limited results and what has been referred to as "broken promises" a decade later, many scholars concluded that the reform should not have been expected to promote change. Baudelot and Establet in France (1971) and Bowles and Gintis (1976) in the United States, for example, have articulated that, given the structure of economic and political power, no substantial change can be achieved through educational reform alone. Education, the argument goes, is an instrument used by the dominant class to legitimize its privileges and to reproduce itself.
David Paris (1995) points out that the constant frustration with the inability of educational reform movements to deliver promises can be explained by the fact that "we have high and perhaps unrealistic expectations about what schools can and should do" (ibid., p. 10). Henry Levin (1976) has argued that it is misleading to expect education to promote change in the structure of society. He explains, with specific reference to the case of the United States:
[T]he educational systems correspond to the social, economic, and political institutions of our society and. . . the only way we can obtain significant changes in educational functions and relations is to forge changes in the overall social, economic, and political relationship that characterize polity. As a major corollary of this view. . . no educational reforms will succeed if they violate the major tenets of our social, economic, and political systems; and in any stable (non revolutionary) society, the educational system will always be applied toward serving the role of cultural transmission and preserving the status quo despite the emergence of academic debates and utopian vision on the issue. . Similarly, Martin Carnoy (1976b) argues that educational reforms in both the past and contemporary periods, regardless of the good intentions and ideals of the agents who initiate them, have been an efficient device that contributes to "preserving social order" and "maintaining an inequitable class structure" (p. 151). He finds a philosophical similarity between the role played by the churches in the promotion of public school for the poor in the United States and that of the missionaries in Africa and Asia (p. 120).
The privileged groups in society in fact can use reform as a mechanism to preserve their privileges. As Bray, Clarke, and Stephen (1986) conclude based on various African examples:
Fundamental reforms are often resisted by influential sectors of society, for while changes may be very desirable for the majority, they are usually to the detriment of a minority. In this case, we must realize that governments are composed of individuals who are themselves members of a social élite. . . Indeed, in some cases, so-called reforms are no more than ways in which the élite increase their power rather than the opposite. (P. 173).
This has been the main argument articulated by Pierre Bourdieu and Jean-Claude Passeron (1979) who, using the French case, explain that the educational system cannot be expected to change social inequality since students enter and exit the system according to the social structure.
In the case of Côte d'Ivoire, although monetary constraints and the nature of teacher involvement are important factors, Assié-Lumumba and LumumbaKasongo (1991) concluded that reform was not meant to change the political system. Implementation of educational reform is first of all a political problem rather than a technical one (as viewed by the World Bank and the IMF). The educational system inherited from France is unlikely to be transformed into a dialogical, national, and liberatory system as embodied in the proposed reform unless power relations change at the national level and between Côte d'Ivoire and France and also the international organizations (p. 277).
Pai Obanya (1979) argues that, despite the claim to promote a system that would "meet the needs of independent nations," educational reform documents in Africa have often "attracted attention more because of their titles than their content." Such titles as "Education for Self-Reliance," "Education for Kasusumo," "New National Policy on Education," "Éducation du Peuple," and "Éducation Nouvelle" do give rise to great expectations (p. 333).
To address the gender component of these reforms, it is important to define the concept. As it is used in this paper, gender refers to the representation of men and women, boys and girls, in a given social system. The analysis of gender focuses on the dynamic relations between men and women in the various spheres of society: politics, the economy, education, and so forth. Although assessment of the distribution of education, for example, focuses on the female population, within the framework of gender as an analytical concept, analysis aims at determining the impact of the gender stratification of power as it is reflected in the legislative and executive bodies, which in turn determine the level and persistence of gender inequality in the educational system.
The analysis of educational distribution along gender lines in this paper combines qualitative, historical, and quantitative methods. The historical and qualitative analysis locates the issues of education distribution and the political economy of education in local, national, and international contexts. The dynamics of access to higher education by the female population are analyzed within the African political economy and the world capitalist system.
The historical and qualitative analysis is complemented by quantitative analysis, which includes univariate, bivariate, and multivariate levels. The specific statistical techniques used for these are: -frequency distributions/percentages, ratios and measures of central tendencies (e.g., means) for univariate analysis; -Pearson correlation for bivariate analysis and; -regression for the multivariate analysis. Pearson correlation and multiple regression are adequate because all the variables are measured at interval level.
The basic model for the regression analysis is:
where G refers to the change in the average school enrollment ratio, i the ith country, X k the value of the kth independent variable, and the b's are the regression coefficients. That is to say that:
which can be specified with G, F, S, and E representing respectively vectors of enrollment ratio, financial, social, and educational characteristics. This means that the change in the growth rate of female educational enrollment at the national level is influenced by financial/economic, social, and educational factors. It is important to note that other political and local factors not included in the model may be powerful predictors of female educational demand as reflected in enrollment rates. The specific equation is:
This equation means that the growth rate of female enrollment in education in a given country is a linear function of that country's financial capability, as measured by selected indicators that are specified in the variables selected.
The main hypothesis is that countries with depressed economies are more likely to experience a decline, stagnation or slow increase in enrollment rates. The coefficients are not expected to be very strong because other key variables such as political-will that play a major role, directly or as intervening factors, are not available to be included in the quantitative model. It should also be indicated that the data are of limited quantity and quality. Given the frequent occurrence of missing data, fewer countries are included in the quantitative analysis particularly at the multivariate level. However, it should be added that the analysis of the fragile and dependent African economies helps contextualize the significance of the data and provide complementary information for a more comprehensive understanding.
The following section specifies the variables, that constitute the focus of the analysis. The dependent variable is measured in terms of female enrollment ratio in higher education in any given year, an average ratio over a number of years, or the changes in the annual growth rates. The predictors in the multiple regression models are: Gross Domestic Investment, Public Expenditure on Education as a percentage of Gross National Product, Public Expenditure on Education as a percentage of Government Expenditure, and Government deficit/surplus as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) at current prices.
The data used are obtained from various sources, but mainly UNESCO, African Development Bank, and Donors to African Education. As mentioned above, it should be emphasized that out of the 53 African countries, which constitute the cases in the analysis, few are used in the multiple regression analysis because of missing data on many countries for the selected variables in the model. Neither did all countries experience the economic crisis at the same time and with the same magnitude. Also, countries can be classified on the basis of whether or not and when they adopted the SAPs. For example, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritania, Mauritius, Nigeria, Senegal, Tanzania, Togo, and Zambia received early intensive adjustment treatment with more than one Structural Adjustment Loan (SAL) by 1985, while Benin, Botswana, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Liberia, and Rwanda did not received any adjustment loan until 1988. A third category of countries received other types of loans (Elbadawi, Ghura and Uwujaren 1992) . However, the economic crisis has been widespread and the profound negative impact of its proposed cure (SAPs) on public resources for social services (especially female education) have been felt throughout the continent. The total number of countries which have valid data for the relevant variables and, thus, are included in the analysis varies from 33 in the case of Public Expenditure on Education as a percentage of Gross National Product in 1985 to 18 in the case of Public Expenditure on Education as percentage of Government Expenditure in 1995. In the multivariate analysis only 18 cases with valid data for each variable in the model are included in the equation.
Before this analysis it is important to locate the current situation in its global and historical contexts.
Gender Inequality and Educational Reforms
In this section, I discuss the historical foundation and crystallization of structural gender imbalance in African education systems, educational reform measures, and the ongoing patterns of educational distribution among the male and female populations on the continent.
A brief historical recapitulation shows that discourse on the democratization of education has been part of educational policy debates since European formal education was introduced in Africa. For example, the fundamental question of what type of education for the Africans as colonized people should have was debated from the end of the nineteenth century following the Berlin Conference to the independence movements of the 1950s, particularly after the 1948 UNESCO declaration of education as a basic human right. In this historical context, gender issues in Europe at the time of colonial conquest (prost 1968) , and the imperatives of colonial domination were major determining factors in the formulation of education policies for Africans in general, and specifically for girls and women in the colonies.
Gender imbalance in access to education was not relevant in the African indigenous education systems. Every child in precolonial societies regardless of gender, was educated, as every member of the community was expected to contribute to the community's social activities from a very young age. The skills to perform such activities were acquired through formal, informal, and nonformal education. In less westernized contemporary societies (as in rural areas), this philosophy still exists.
The current formal systems of education set up by the Europeans from the end of the nineteeth century, and the current issues of gender imbalance in education must be traced back to the inception of today's systems of education. Each European colonial power designed an educational policy that fit its own world vision, ethos, and national objectives. For example, the British policy encouraged churches to develop education in the colonies. The French preferred direct state control from Paris through a highly centralized administration. The Belgians (initially King Leopold II) gave full power to the Vatican to set up the educational system in exchange for authorization to christianize the Africans. While all these colonial policies had their differences, they also had some major similarities. They were an integral part of the colonial system and, thus, had to make sure that education did not raise the level of consciousness of Africans sufficiently to prompt their questioning of this system. The Judeo-Christian common denominator also had specific implications for gender.
Distribution of colonial education reflected the European conception of gender relations and gender roles in society. All European colonial powers were essentially patriarchal, and at the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century when they set up general and educational policies in their colonies, they had not yet accepted gender equality in distribution of education themselves. European schools run by missions (British and Belgian colonies) and states (France) enrolled African girls with the purpose of training future wives and mothers whose main endeavors were to be performed in the private sphere of the home. By contrast, the boys were trained to fill the low-ranking positions of clerical, construction, and agricultural workers -in other words, to make livings outside their homes. Furthermore, the Europeans created schools for "chiefs' sons" (Yates 1982) who were trained by the colonial administration to play the roles of leaders in the future. African men were trained for the immediate fulfillment of Europeans' interests. However, most of these African men who attended the colonial schools as young boys came to control local politics and policies at the time of independence.
Colonial policies initiated the process of institutionalized marginalization of African women and of negative homogenization of African women's location in society. This negative homogenization results from Europeans imposing policies and values designed by European men with their patriarchal foundations. Furthermore, they reinforced the potential/existing patriarchal elements in those African societies where they existed. Most indigenous African societies were based on dual male-female participation. African traditions that empowered women were deliberately ignored or destroyed by the Europeans through their colonial policies. Women were displaced in the social structure even in the numerous locales where women had led anti-colonial struggles before the European administration took over.
A major colonial legacy of gender imbalance with regard to education outcome is the feminization and simultaneous devaluation of certain fields of study and occupation. These fields began to be characterized by patterns according to the inherited European model, such as the study of nursing principally by women while men were, in larger proportion, being trained to become medical doctors.
In the colonial era, the most obvious characteristic of the social structure and of the educational policy was unequal opportunity along racial lines. As in the case of Zimbabwe which represents the situation in other countries, including administered/non-settler colonies, "the society was stratified mainly on racial criteria, which were the bases for ordering nearly all social relations. . . [C]ontinued manipulation of the economic, political, and educational structures was particularly important in maintaining white dominance during the colonial era" (Dorsey 1989:41) .
All social issues raised by Africans during colonization and at the time of their independence were presented in the dichotomous/dual terms of Blacks/Africans versus Whites/Europeans. Other components of the structural inequality (e.g., gender) built into the colonial system were not systematically addressed. The equality demanded by the new African leaders between European countries and the colonies, and between the colonists and the African people, clearly emphasized their quest for access to the same privileges as Europeans. In terms of educational opportunity, this meant that it would be possible for African leaders to send their children to the type of school hitherto reserved for the European colonial/ruling class. At the time of independence, the structural gender-inequities were assumed to be sufficiently addressed in terms of their sociohistorical roots and socioeconomic prerequisites to achieve long-term and fundamental changes.
The implementation of the new principle of equality, as applied to relations between Blacks and Whites, implied making European cultures available to the Africans. In part, this was to enable Africans to take high administrative, commercial, and industrial positions. The Africans aspired to replace the European leaders and, thus, questioned only incidentally the gender component in their policies or gender representation among the emerging African elite. In former French colonies, for example, based on the laws of assimilation and their implementation which started in the 1940s and continued until independence in the 1960s, many changes took place that aimed at reproducing the French educational system.
As indicated earlier, it became legitimate, almost a ritual, for newly independent African states to initiate a reform of the systems inherited from the European colonial administrations. Different mechanisms were set by different countries to assess the situation and to propose new systems. The reform documents were legally adopted, whether or not the reforms were to be actually implemented.
In addition to the reform documents which proclaim commitment to equal access irrespective of gender and other grounds of social differentiation, African states have signed or ratified the many agreements and conventions adopted by the United Nations General Assembly, which aim at eliminating inequality based on gender and protecting women's rights and focus on education. These rights are all related to education as a human right or women's access to education, particularly at the higher levels, enabling them to know, defend, and enjoy their rights in every sphere of society. To cite a few, the following have been recognized by African African countries have also signed a number of conventions -which address the specific domain of work, labor, and gender -that have been adopted by the General Conference of the International Labor Organization (ILO).
Of direct interest for this paper is the Convention against Discrimination in Education which was adopted by the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in 1963.
Besides UNESCO whose mission focuses on education, in other conventions and resolutions, education also has been identified as one of the key areas for which legal provisions must be set. For instance, in the case of CEDAW, the eight paragraphs of Article 10 of Part III address educational issues in terms of elimination or prevention of any forms of inequality. This article states that "parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in order to ensure equal rights with men in the field of education and in particular to ensure [rights] on a basis of equality of men and women" (United Nations Economic Commission (1995:29) . The areas of concern cover the education system, addressing equality of access to all types and levels of education, retention, the curriculum, and values that are instilled in the process of education, output, and outcomes.
Since the creation of the OAU (Organization of African Unity) in 1963, African countries which attain independence have also signed or ratified several binding agreements, such as the African Charter on Human and People's Rights, adopted in 1981 by the OAU.
These international conventions and agreements have had, and continue to have, an impact on domestic laws, including the constitution and educational reform documents. However, the adoption of these laws becomes significant and meaningful only if they translate into policies articulated in reform documents with actual strategies for implementation.
Despite considerable work in the research, design, and legal adoption of reform documents as well as genuine efforts to implement them (e.g., Julius K. Nyerere 1968) , assessment of the situation at the end of the twentieth century indicates that, in addition to the historical factors that hindered female enrollment in Africa, another set of factors emerged throughout the last hundred years. The new factors reinforce the effects of initial ones, and together they are entrenched in the systems and persist, sometimes with new dimensions, in the face of new local and global challenges. As a result, one of the main features of educational statistics on almost the whole continent is a low representation of the female population, from the lower to the upper levels, leading to lower literacy rates among the young and adult female population.
Though relevance of language for literacy must be considered, persistently in most African countries, whatever the language that is used as the medium for instruction, the illiterate person is more likely to be female than male. For example, in 1990, the literate adult population in Africa South of the Sahara was 58.9 percent male and 36.0 percent female (Donors to African Education 1994:29). Crossnational variations also exist, as do even deeper imbalances in some countries, ranging from 27.9 percent male literate in Burkina Faso and 30.7 percent in Sierra Leone to 87.7 percent in Madagascar and 83.4 percent in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Females adult literacy was 8.9 percent in Burkina Faso, 11.3 percent in Sierra Leone, 72.9 percent in Madagascar, and 60.7 percent in Congo (Donors to African Education 1994) . Despite national differences, the patterns of lower proportions of adult female literacy rates can be generalized even in Southern African countries such as Botswana, which have experienced trends of high female enrollments in schools. The exceptions of higher female literacy-rates are few, Lesotho constituting in fact a rare case in its sociohistorical, socioeconomic, and political context in the Southern African region.
Even during the period of rapid expansion in the 1960s and 1970s, gender parity was not achieved. Educational statistics at the end of the 1990s reveal consistent patterns of female under-representation. Moreover, with a few exceptions in Southern Africa, generally at the specific level of the university, there is an even smaller proportion of female students in the fields of science. This creates asymmetrical gender representation in the labor market, the occupational structure, decisionmaking, political leadership, intelligentsia, and the producers of knowledge.
During the colonial era there was a clear-cut line between the colonizing oppressors and the colonized oppressed who were denied equal access to education (regardless of Africans' own attitude toward European education). In the postcolonial period however the process of a new social differentiation and class formation among the Africans started. Formal education constituted the key-determining factor in the class crystallization. Thus, the notion of gender-gap should be analyzed with the class dimension. For instance, it was found that in Burkina Faso " [t] he most striking discrepancy is between the category of higher-level professionals and farmers and stockraisers. The representation index for these two groups shows that a child whose father belongs to the former category is over 130 times more likely to have access to higher education than the child of farmers" (Assié-Lumumba 1993b:24). The discrepancy is usually even bigger among the female population of different social classes. Indeed, female under-representation is strongly related to social class. More generally, it is the combined effects of social class, area of residence (rural vs. urban), region, and cultural factors that determine girls' chances for becoming women with a successful educational attainment and certain socioeconomic and sociopolitical realization. Thus, the project of nation-building (Cowan, O'Connell, and Scanlon 1965) using formal education and the agenda of promoting gender parity in education through postcolonial reform must be analyzed within the structural framework of social class formation and consolidation.
In addition to African states' inability to achieve universal primary enrollment as targeted for 1980 (Conference of African States on the Development of Education in Africa 1961), which would have de facto eliminated gender inequality at this level and reduced significantly gender disparity in secondary and higher education levels, shortly after this target year enrollment rates suddenly entered a stage of decline or stagnation at all levels in nearly twenty countries. This new phenomenon was in sharp contrast with the educational expansion of the two previous decades, which experienced constant enrollment growth, although only a few of the countries (e.g., Congo, Tanzania) reached universal primary enrollment.
The downward trend of the 1980s caught many specialists by surprise as, based in part on historical experiences from other regions of the world and on the African performance of the 1960s to 1970s, a steady increase at all levels was expected until universal primary attendance was achieved and the law of compulsory attendance was expected de facto fully implemented. During the colonial era and in the first post-independence years in Africa as elsewhere (e.g., case of India by Carnoy 1977) , the "trickle down" theory was the foundation for setting educational policies. This dictated that systems should generate incentives for high demand for education among populations of the lower socioeconomic strata (Berstecher and Carr-Hill 1990) .
The causes of this phenomenon were analyzed from various perspectives. Berstecher and Carr-Hill (1990:63) summarize the main factors and group them in four categories: 1. The high cost of schooling to households relative to their ability to pay; 2. the lower than expected future benefits of schooling in terms of the opportunities for social mobility; 3. the perceived inappropriateness of the "modern" school by members of the community; 4. and the inadequate quality of the educational as perceived by parents.
It should be added that there was neither a clear sign nor any specific study at the time that showed that enrollment rates among girls had declined significantly. In the case of Togo, for example, Marie-France Lange (1984) explains that, as far as the primary school level is concerned, the trend continued to be a slight increase in the enrollment rates of girls between 1971 to 1972 and 1982 to 1983 . Thus, she concluded that the drastic and general decreases that occurred in the 1979/80 school year did not affect the new girls' enrollment in the first grade of primary school.
In African countries, external agencies in bilateral or multilateral cooperation have played a major role in the policies of education with an inevitable impact on the distribution based on gender. Berstecher and Carr-Hill's omission of these factors was a major weakness. The next section of this paper presents the economic contexts, the economic crisis and subsequent reforms, and their impact on education supply and demand. It emphasizes the impact of externally derived policies.
Economic Crisis and Reforms: The SAPs and the Conditionalities of Social Services
In its 1999 edition of the African Development Report, the African Development Bank (1999:81) pointed out that, while "international financial market integration" has led to the "rapid flow of capital across borders," it has at the same time magnified "the contagion effect of financial crises" (p. 81). Thus, the African economies have been suffering strong effects of the East and South East Asian financial crisis, specifically in trade and finance. In the search to nullify the extreme dependence of African countries on their respective former colonial masters, an effort to diversify trade partners resulted in increasing exports from Africa to Asia, reaching 13 percent in 1996.
Faced with economic crises, individual African countries adopted varying measures of an "austerity" policy. At the regional level, the Lagos Plan of Action was adopted in 1980 by African heads of state and government. This was a statement indicating that they realized the importance of and preferred an Africanconceived global strategy not limited to immediate short-term solutions, but also dedicated to fostering long-term economic growth and social progress. However, in the context of the dependency framework, the Berg proposal -for economic reform -was imposed roadmap for a rough, uncertain, and painful journey (Browne and Cummings 1985) .
"Donors to African Education," which evolved to become the Association for the Development of Education in Africa (ADEA) and, which includes foundations, governmental agencies, and international organization such as the World Bank, became involved in formulating African education. Through production of policy documents, recommendations, hidden or overt prescription (World Bank 1988 , and use of lending as a tool for policy design, especially through the Educational Sector Lending for Policy Reform (ESLPR), the World Bank has been a decisive player in policy formulation in African countries. In 1995, it directly or indirectly stood on "the critical path" of nearly 75 percent of total capital flows and debt relief to Africa. Several types of loan schemes, including the following, have been put into operation: 1. Investment Loans, which include (a) specific investment loans (SILs) and (b) sector investment loans (SECILs); 2. Sector Adjustment Loans (SECALs); 3. Hybrid combinations of an investment of component like a SIL or SECIL with an adjustment component like a SECAL; and 4. Structural Adjustment Loans (SALs) which focus on macroeconomics and are not intended to address directly concerns that are specific to the sector, except as these concerns influence general economic stability. African countries experienced the economic crisis in different ways on the basis of the different historical contingencies and their specific objective conditions at the time. Despite the diversity of African countries' initial conditions, the varying magnitudes and manifestations of the crisis, and the effects of internally and externally conceived treatments, some indicators have been fairly common.
For instance, between 1980 and 1990, available statistics indicate an increase in the continental average annual total external debt to 8.8 millions of U.S. dollars. The period between 1991 to 1997 indicates a decline (1.8 for the continent) and negative growth rates in several countries (e.g., Kenya, Nigeria). The economic crises and proposed remedies have had direct implications for budget allocation and government priorities for social sectors, of which education and health are among the most vital ones.
In the specific area of health, for example, statistics indicate that life expectancy at birth decreased in some countries between 1980 and 1997. For example, in Botwsana, life expectancy decreased from 58 years for males and 62 for females in 1980 to 50 for males and 52 for females in 1997. Similar trends are found in Malawi, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Even when increases in most countries are taken into account, on the continent as a whole, the changes moved from 48 years for males and 51 for females to only 52 for males to 55 for females, with an average increase of four years for males and females (African Development Bank 1999). While the AIDS epidemic has contributed to some of these negative trends, there is no doubt that lack of investment in health infrastructures and human resources has also influenced health trends. Morewer, increased poverty has prevented families from filling the gap left by the governments.
In the specific case of education, as indicated in Table 1 , public recurrent expenditure per student decreased drastically at each level of the educational systems between 1980 and 1990. The highest drops were registered at the higher education levels.
In spite of the pressure from international institutions such as the World Bank (which in the context of SAPs, call for disengagement), several countries continued to profess their commitment to subsidize education with the expectation that it will help close the gender-gap. For example, in the 1990 Constitution of Benin, Articles 8, 12, 13, and 14 define the position of the state with regard to the right of the individual citizen to an education. Articles 8 and 12 stipulate specifically that the state and its agencies have a legal obligation to secure an education for all citizens, with an emphasis on the youth (Article 12). Article 13 also indicates that "primary education is compulsory" and that the "state gradually provides free public education." However, it is one thing to make a declaration Mauritania  167  86  972  406  2875  2020  Rwanda  41  54  415  182  3329  4050  Senegal  191  116  530  258  3676  2681  Sierra Leone  31  6  122  35  3672  777  Swaziland  74  70  268  246  1053  2316  Tanzania  11  12  193  132  1809  1412  Togo  45  46  180  189  4858  1398  Zambia  56  16  321  138  3084  865  Zimbabwe  143  126  761  233  2398  806 Source: Donors to African Education, 1994. Cited in (Odaga and Heneveld 1995:82) .
of intention and to even express genuine political-will; it is another to be able to translate those intentions into policies that are implemented. The harsh reality of the economic crisis and conditionalities of the SAPs define the actual policy of resource allocation. It is important to note that between 1985 and 1995 the enrollment ratio for females at the first level increased by only .9 percent, while most countries have not reached universal primary school enrollment. However, at the third level there was an increase of 9.2 percent during the same period. While a cross-sectional analysis might suggest that changes in the enrollment rates at these levels are not related, in reality the figures suggest that the dynamic nature of education must be taken into consideration in policy planning. Indeed, the relatively higher enrollment rates in the third levels reflect the steady increase of female enrollment at the primary and secondary levels in the period preceding the crisis of the 1980s. Female representation in the higher education level was so low in the beginning that even with the 9 percent increase in 1995, only 37.3 percent of the students were females, as shown in Figure 2 . Based on the deferred positive effect at the Figure 2 . Percentage Female Enrollment at 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Levels of Education in Africa, 1985 Africa, , 1990 Africa, , 1995 higher education level due to earlier fast-paced increase in primary and secondary levels, it is legitimate to anticipate a deferred negative impact due to the slowpaced and negative growth rates at the lower levels of the system, with literally a stagnation around 45 percent over a period of ten years, with 44.7 percent in 1985, 44.9 percent in 1990, and 45.2 percent in 1995.
The next section analyzes the SAPs' economic and financial impact on female enrollment at the higher education level and African societies at large.
Adjustment and the State of Gender Balance in Higher Education
Higher education and state and nation-building in Africa have a dynamic relationship. In many African countries, World Bank loans have been adopted and implemented before and/or simultaneously with other types of loans. However, there are a few cases in the 1980s where SILs, Hybrids, and SECALs were implemented in education without prior implementation of the SALs, as was the case in Madagascar, Mali, and Nigeria. It was assumed that higher education problems in Africa could be addressed or solved by some direct foreign investment (DFI) or sector adjustment loans alone. In order to understand the implications of the sector or specific loans in higher education, it is necessary to relate them to macroeconomic imbalances arguments and to the nature of the African state as an external historical creation and a contemporary external instrument affecting the lives of the majority irrespective of its will.
Higher education was not alien to Africa prior to European colonization and introduction of their education systems (Ajayi et al. 1996) . However, at the end of the twentieth century, African higher education institutions are the legacy or postcolonial mirrors of European institutions (Ashby 1964) . During the colonial era only a few embryonic institutions of higher learning were designed by the Europeans. The British had colleges at Achimota, Makerere, Ibadan, Rhodesia, Nyassaland, and Fourah Bay. Also, the French influenced education in Dakar. By and large, enrollment was negligible at the time of the independence of each country (Assié-Lumumba 1993b) .
The state became an instrument to redress past inequalities in access and an agent of training labour for a planned economy. Therefore, structures, objectives, mechanisms of functioning, and finance of higher education in Africa can be fully examined and understood only by looking at how they interact with the processes of state-building. As argued elsewhere (Assié-Lumumba and Lumumba- Kasongo 1996) , state-building as the objective of the first generation of African political elites, was a process in which legal, social, and political institutions were constructed and consolidated to articulate the intended social development and national reconstruction in the aftermath of intensive colonial exploitation. The political elites philosophically and territorially imagined the characteristics of sovereignty and citizenry to include all the African populations, males and females. State-building in Africa also has important international dimensions related to the dynamics of the world economy and education, particularly higher education. This reality of the global system directly affects the gender component of any education policy.
Conceived as an instrument of global social development after the colonial experience, higher education was firmly supported in terms of institutional-building, development of the teaching profession, and support services so that the student body of predominantly modest social origins could study in good institutional environments. The preeminence of the state in defining the future direction of society led to its becoming nearly the sole agent of subsidy of higher education: full scholarships, travel and local transportation expenses, health care, board, lodging, and monthly stipends and living expenses of qualified students. In most cases this was done within a broad sentiment of nationalism. In some cases it was accompanied by a sense of unlimited resources/investments that were assumed to bring returns (Assié-Lumumba and Lumumba- Kasongo 1992) .
This tandem policy of nation-building and educational development through state financing was abruptly halted by the economic crisis and the prescriptive measures dictated by the World Bank and others. Thus, public support dropped drastically between the early 1980s and 1990s as shown in Table 1 . The decrease in state support was more dramatic at the higher education level and was reflected in recurrent budget, as well as in capital investment. With no new infrastructures built, there was an indirect message and often a direct prescription to curtail enrollment. Many studies have analyzed various ramifications of the crisis in higher education (Coombe 1991; Saint 1992; Assié-Lumumba 1996b) . The focus here is on how the cut-backs impacted women's enrollment, given that it was lagging even before the crisis, and know to how the international and national awareness of this gender-gap translated into investment priorities.
A glance at Table 2 reveals that the actual policies, practices, and results do not reflect the goals of the official speeches, stated commitments, national reforms, and international agreements that are supposed to improve the status of women and the distribution of education.
Another study , indicated that the decline in enrollment rates from the 1980 to 1988 was explained by a set of variables reflecting characteristics of the society and economy. The variables entered in a regression model were: average population growth rate, the percentage of total population living in urban areas, the GNP per capita average annual growth rate, the average annual rate of inflation, the percentage of GNP devoted to education, and the average annual growth rate of public expenditure on education. These variables explained 27.06 percent, 21.51 percent, and 89.22 percent of the variance of the enrollment growth rates in primary, secondary, and higher education levels, respectively.
It is interesting to point out the striking difference between the primary/secondary levels and higher education variances. The stronger impact of public expenditure on higher education in Africa, especially in the 1980s, when virtually all higher learning institutions were funded by public revenues (Negrao 1994) , is not surprising because families and communities contributed significantly to the overall cost of primary and secondary education (Assié-Lumumba 1993a , 1994 Bray and Lillis 1988; William Saint 1992; Negrao 1994 ). An assessment comparing the average annual growth rate of recurrent expenditure to the average annual growth rate of capital expenditure would provide a more refined basis for explaining the impact of different educational budget aspects on enrollment in the 1980s.
However, various data suggest that government resources as measured in the model have a more direct and powerful impact on enrollment at highereducation levels. At lower levels of education, especially the primary level, the local population plays a more crucial role, covering much of the direct cost, as well as opportunity cost. But, at the university level, public support covers direct cost and reduces the opportunity cost for students and their families through scholarships, especially for socially disadvantaged groups. Scholarships sometimes become vital income for members of the students' families, especially younger siblings of school age.
The data that include 1990 and focus on patterns of female attendance ratio are used to assess some of the impact of the SAPs on women's access to higher education. In addition to the vulnerability that "the exogeneity of the determinants of economic growth in Africa" (Elbad 1992: 2) entails, it important to recall that growth may not necessarily lead to investment in social sectors. Figure 3 shows that between 1985 and 1995 an increase of 5 percent in the ratio of female enrollment to tertiary education was realized when the increase in public expenditure in education as a percentage of gross national product was equivalent to just .5 percent. Figure 4 indicates that during the same period, an increase in public expenditure on education as a percentage of government expenditure, equivalent to 3.5 percent was observed. Increase in public expenditure on education as a percentage of government expenditure has a positive impact on the percentage ratio of female enrollment.
The climate of the 1980s was unfavorable to public support for education in general and particularly for higher education in Africa, which the World Bank argued should have been dismantled altogether (interview with the Rector of Université Cheikh Anta Diop in Dakar Senegal, August 1992) . Despite the chorus of international expression of support for women's equal access to education, the World Bank as a key designer of the educational landscape in Africa was promoting a policy that undermined the spirit and achievement of the postcolonial reforms.
In a study published by the Bank itself, the authors (Subbarao et al. 1994 ) state that in its patterns of investment in Africa, the World Bank decreased the relative importance accorded to education during the period of the economic crisis and its treatment, despite expressed interest in increasing female enrollment in higher education. This decade was also characterized by steady enrollment growth of both male and female students. During the decade of severe economic crisis and SAPs treatment, the Bank promoted lending policies, which, in addition to a negative attitude towards higher education in Africa in general, were not favorable to women's increased representation. Thus, the proportion of the World Bank's education projects in which gender was acknowledged, with possible policy implication, was 28 percent for the period of 1972 to 1981, while the proportion of Africa, 1985 Africa, -1995 total investment in education projects acknowledging gender was 16 percent in the same period. Furthermore, by the early 1990s, there was a clear "regional shift" in favor of South Asia, where the number of projects acknowledging gender increased from 12 percent to 38 percent, and the investment in the projects acknowledging gender importance also increased, from 8 percent to 65 percent. At the same time, on the whole, the "total investment in higher education projects acknowledging gender in the Sub-Saharan African region during the 1980s decreased to a mere 6 percent from 16 percent in the 1970s" (Subbarao et al. 1994:32) . A relatively strong positive correlation is observed between female enrollment ratio and gross domestic investment and gross national savings, and a negative correlation with labor force participation of females as a percentage of population of all ages in labor force. Other economic parameters of interest are: public expenditure on education as a percentage of gross national product, and public expenditure on education as a percentage of government expenditure.
The bivariate statistics illustrated in Figures 3 and 4 indicate that the percentage of female enrollment ratio and the public expenditure on education as a percentage of the gross national product, and particularly as a percentage of government expenditure, have a positive and linear relation. This relation is also evidenced by the relatively high Pearson correlation coefficients for 1980, 1990, and 1995 in Tables 3 and 4 listed above. There is relatively strong positive correlation observed between female enrollment ratio and gross domestic investment, gross national savings, and a negative correlation with labor force participation of females as a percentage of population of all ages in the labor force. These respective variables and the female enrollment ratio to higher are significantly correlated. However, public expenditure on education as a percentage of the gross national product seems to be more constant over the years.
The negative relation with labor force participation of the female population is a logical one since in African countries, unlike in North America where graduate and undergraduate students work and study, conditions make studying and earning a living two mutually exclusive life choices. The more women "choose" to participate in the labor force, the fewer they will be on the higher education front. As women have to make earlier choices amidst the economic crisis and the SAPs recommendations for lay-offs, "early" retirement, salary freezes and decreases that affect the male contributors of the family livelihood, there has been even more pressure on women to enter the labor market. As indicated before, the social class dimension must be taken seriously. Indeed, the upper elite with solid revenues that survived the economic vagaries are less likely to succumb to the pressure of having to choose an early exit from education to enter the labor market after secondary or undergraduate studies.
In the study (Assié-Lumumba 1991) mentioned earlier, which had 89.22 percent of the variance of higher education enrollment growth rates in the 1980s explained by selected economic and educational factors, a note of caution from the author indicated that due to the limited number of valid cases used to test to the multiple regression model, it would not be prudent "to make a big deal of the variance explained although they constitute a great incentive for further investigation" (p. 26). Nevertheless, it is interesting to find that similar economic and education factors lead to an equally high proportion of variance explained in the female enrollment ratio in the 1990s. Indeed, a test of several models for predicting percentage of female enrollment ratio to higher education provides evidence of important factors in the economy that predict the ratio of female enrollment to tertiary education. The 1990 and 1995 data contained the following predictors: gross domestic investment, public expenditure on education as a percentage of gross national product, public expenditure on education as a percentage of government expenditure, and government deficit/surplus as a percentage of GDP at current prices. These variables in the model contributed to explain up to 98.3 percent of the variance in female enrollment. Because of the limited number of valid cases, again as in the study that focused on the 1980s, there is a call for caution in drawing conclusions based on the variance explained. However, there is a clear indication that these economic conditions determine higher-education attendance to a considerable extent. Given the continued high population-growth rates, the large pool of school-age population for all levels of the educational system, and the continued relative value attached to education as an instrument for negotiation in the labor market and on the social ladder, economic factors appear to clearly constitute a major constraint to access to education. When families are under siege by an economic crisis and a bitter proclaimed remedy, they expect even more support from the state. When the state no longer provides support in the proportion of its budget allocated to education, particularly higher education, then the result can be felt in the pattern of enrollment growth rates, with greater chances of affecting the groups that remain the most under-represented in the system.
Conclusion
One of the main criticisms of the SAPs' policy dictating that total cost be borne by the users is its failure to consider the social class structure of students and their families and their actual needs for public financial and/or in-kind support. It should be stressed that the importance of state involvement in higher education is not unique to African countries. As a matter of fact, among a group of thirty-three countries, including four African countries south of Sahara, France ranked second with the smallest proportion of its recurrent expenditures in public higher education institutions from tuition fees (Negrao 1994) . Another criticism has been the move from one extreme to another: from a past state policy of extending services to all students, including those who, on the basis of their socioeconomic background, could have afforded to pay for the services and registration, to the elimination of public support regardless of the actual needs. All users now bear the cost. The SAPs-imposed suppression of public support for education without looking at the actual needs of the users is detrimental to the effort to reduce the gender-gap.
Whether the policy of users bearing the cost is discussed within the framework of private or public institutions, there is no conceptual or practical difference in terms of how this policy affects students from different social origins, particularly the female population. The application of the policy of decreasing public support in favor of users' fees at the lower levels of the systems would eliminate, from the very beginning, the most economically vulnerable segments of the population, particularly girls from farming areas and small traders in urban areas whose opportunity cost for education is high even at a young age. The introduction of registration fees and payment for services would be the final stage eliminating those families who cannot afford to pay, especially farmers whose purchasing power have drastically diminished as a result of the decline in the prices of agricultural commodities. Yet, they still constitute the largest proportion of African population.
The determinant source of educational policies in Africa has been the economic reforms of which the most influential and generalized have been, without any doubt, the World Bank. In his assessment of the extent to which the "World Bank-Supported Adjustment Programs Improved Economic Performance in SubSaharan Africa," Elbadawi (1992) concluded that while SAPs had some positive effects on export, they had "negative and significant influence on investment" (p. 45) and "the perceived increase in the efficiency of investment -supposed to be generated by the reform programs -has not been sufficient, in order to counterbalance the ensuing decline in investment, and hence to restore economic growth" (p. 46). There was a call for "more public investment on infrastructure, human capital, and agricultural technology" considered "particularly crucial for generating supply response in SSA" (p. 47).
After African countries as a group failed to achieve universal primary enrollment and to significantly increase secondary and tertiary enrollments by 1980 (as they agreed at the 1961 Addis Ababa Conference), the new magical date set to reach these targets became 2000. At the Jomtien (Thailand) Conference in 1990, the last year of the twentieth century seemed far away and, thus, they considered the goal of providing basic education for all to be reachable. It is now a reality that it will not be achieved when the twenty-first century starts in 2001.
Some foundations, governments, and United Nations agencies have made direct contributions and/or provided support to regional and local NGOs such as the Forum for African Women Educationalists (FAWE). Their support is to press for the adoption and implementation of policies that aim to eliminate the gender imbalance in access to, and benefit from, education. However, given the magnitude and depth of the structural gap between male and female enrollment in higher education in Africa, no significant change can be achieved unless there is in place a vigorous and consistent public policy to promote permanent gender parity. In the condition of severe economic crisis and the reliance on loans from international organizations, the nature of the policy design for these projects and the actual investment reflect the state of the educational system. In this case, the decline in recognition of gender special needs in African higher education is a reflection of relative neglect that has led to stagnation and potential setbacks, despite the enthusiasm reflected in the postcolonial educational reform schemes.
Increased and sustained public expenditure on education targeting the female population will be a necessary commitment if gender is to be seriously addressed in concrete terms. This would make it possible to revive it from the earlier educational reform goals that were abruptly halted by the severe economic crisis and the reforms imposed by the Bretton Woods institutions and their devastating effects.
At the end of this analysis, a need for further research to unravel the immediate and long-term impact of the economic crisis and the reform appears necessary. For example, time series and longitudinal studies with fresh and sufficient data will help refine the analysis of the trends of female enrollment in various socioeconomic categories and higher education fields of studies. Empirical studies will be useful to policymakers, advocates of women's rights, researchers and research institutions involved in education in Africa, especially in terms of the intellectual discourse on education and gender issues, and in public policy design for educational development in the next century.
